Rabbi Mendel Agranovich
What should you do if a pot was removed from the flame by mistake, or the gas or electricity was suddenly cut off?
The question posed in our title is a striking example of how a theoretical Talmudic problem can become a real one. Let us explain what we mean.
When we speak of the prohibition against returning food to the flame on Shabbat, the prohibition is defined as follows: only the continuation of a cooking process begun on Friday is permitted; if it was interrupted, resuming the cooking is prohibited. All five conditions we discussed in the previous article are simply a way to establish that the “leaving on the flame” from Friday has not been interrupted. The authors of Orchot Shabbat ask the following question: Must an interruption be active and deliberate, or merely de facto? Essentially, they expressed their uncertainty as follows: What is the law if a pot falls onto the floor or the ground? May it be returned? An unrealistic question, you might say. Perhaps, but still, bear with us...
Another question. We said that placing a pot on the floor unequivocally interrupts the cooking process, even if the person intends to return it. Why? What is this based on?
Let us consider two ways of understanding the definition we gave above.
The first approach. Only if we intended to return the pot and some connection to the place of cooking remained (even if only in our minds) do we consider the cooking process uninterrupted.
The second approach. The process is considered interrupted only if we actively took a step to interrupt the cooking process.
In other words, what is the action considered to be by default: a continuation or an interruption? Must a person demonstrate their intention in order to continue? Or must an action clearly constitute an interruption in order to interrupt?
In other words, when is our initiative required: to interrupt or to leave the food on the flame?
In what situation does the difference between these two approaches become apparent? Have you guessed? Exactly—in the very situation described by the authors of Orchot Shabbat, when a pot falls from the stove onto the floor on its own. On the one hand, no action was taken to interrupt the process (so it may be returned); on the other hand, there is no active connection to the cooking process begun on Friday—it has, in fact, been interrupted, and therefore the pot may not be returned.
But the situation we described, in which the electricity is cut off or the gas flame beneath the pot goes out, falls within this same uncertainty... After all, we did not actively remove the pot from the flame, but since there is no flame, the food is no longer actually standing on it... It turns out that the answer to this question is also the answer to a theoretical problem that would seem to have no practical application. As far as I know, this has often happened in science: A theory finds practical confirmation and application in the future. The same is true of our question.
It turns out that Rabbi Akiva Eiger had already formulated this problem. His question was as follows: If someone removes another person’s pot from the flame, is its actual owner entitled to return it to the flame? The owner neither intended to remove it nor took any action to interrupt the cooking, but, on the other hand, the food is no longer actually on the flame. Rabbi Akiva Eiger invokes the Talmudic principle that a person cannot render an object forbidden if it does not belong to them. Rav Elazar Shach, in his book Avi Ezri, disagrees with him and maintains that this principle does not help in this situation, where the cooking has actually been interrupted. Indeed, if simply removing the pot from the flame is enough to cancel its “being left on the flame” since Friday, how can any of the Talmud’s principles help? The pot is no longer on the flame! BUT! To interrupt the cooking begun on Friday, there must be an active intention to do so, and then the action of someone who has no right to do this simply cannot have any effect!
We now understand that the disagreement between Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who lived in the 19th century, and Rav Shach, our great contemporary, is nothing other than the same two ways of interpreting the definition of the prohibition against returning food to the flame with which we began our article:
1. Only an active step is considered an interruption—that is, when we clearly demonstrate that we want to remove the pot from the flame;
or
2. To return a pot to the flame, we must demonstrate an active desire to leave it on the flame (for example, by not letting go of its handles, not placing it on the floor, and so on).
Following this detailed discussion, let us turn to the practical conclusions:
If a pot was removed by mistake (you thought it contained soup, but it contains tomorrow’s cholent), the food is fully cooked, and the flame is covered (a hotplate or a blech), then:
A) According to Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv and Rav Elazar Shach, it may not be returned to the flame, because the cooking has actually been interrupted;
B) Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach permits returning it, because we may consider that there was no active intention to remove this pot from the flame, and there is a view of the Ran (more about him later) on which we may rely in this case.
If necessary, one may rely on Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach’s view (Orchot Shabbat, 2, note 78)
If the flame beneath the pot goes out, it may be taken to the neighbors according to Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rav Moshe Feinstein, and Rav Shmuel Auerbach, but it may not be according to Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv and Rav Nissim Karelitz.
If your electricity is out, it may be taken to the neighbors according to the same opinions.